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THE NUMBER OF labor law cases annually decided by the Seventh
Circuit is probably not as great as that of several other circuits. Never-
theless, during the 1974 term, the Seventh Circuit issued a large num-
ber of decisions in what could be classified as labor law cases, covering
a wide range of subjects arguably within that broad classification.
These cases dealt with issues relating to employment discrimination,
occupational safety requirements, intra-union affairs under the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, unions' duty of
fair representation, veterans' reemployment rights, pension plans, and
patronage dismissals of public employees.
Perhaps the largest number of the court's decisions came in the
area of labor-management relations and National Labor Relations Board
activity and proceedings under the Labor Management Relations Act.
The court also issued opinions concerning relations under the Railway
Labor Act, dealt with the recurring questions regarding the proper
judicial relationship to arbitration of labor disputes in particular con-
texts, held forth on the question of injunctions in labor disputes, and
faced questions concerning the rights of employees in the public sector
to organize. This review is an attempt to point up selected decisions
in these areas. Whether they extend, narrow, or restate pre-existing
law, these decisions bear a relatively direct relationship to a favored
and protected creature in the rubric of our labor relations law-the col-
lective bargaining relationship.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUEs
Among the labor cases decided by the Seventh Circuit this past
term which raised interesting constitutional or similar issues, three bore
directly upon the collective bargaining relationship. In one of these,
the court reached the constitutional questions and decided on that basis.
In Aurora Education Association v. Board of Education,' seven
* Associate in firm of Dorfman, DeKoven, Cohen & Laner specializing in Labor-
management relations; member of the Illinois Bar; J.D., University of Chicago.
1. 490 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1973) [85 LRRM 2030]. [Where appropriate, the
BNA LABOR RELATIONS REPORTER MANUAL citations are provided for the convenience
of the practitioner].
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
public school teachers and their union successfully appealed the district
court's dismissal of their challenge to a written school board policy
which excluded from all bargaining rights any union which asserted the
right to strike against any agency of the government.
During collective bargaining negotiations with the board, the
union adopted a resolution at one of its meetings to the effect that
teachers would not return to class in the absence of a satisfactory con-
tract settlement. The board thereupon ceased negotiating and offered
each teacher an individual contract through the mail. Each of these
documents contained a clause disqualifying and denying recognition to
the union because of its assertion of the right to strike at the aforemen-
tioned meeting, but disclaimed any denial of the teachers' right to be-
long to the union. Many teachers signed. The seven individual plain-
tiffs refused to do so, and continued to work under the less advanta-
geous expired terms. They brought a suit for injunctive and declara-
tory relief in district court under the 1871 Civil Rights Act2 and the
first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.
The district court's dismissal of the complaint had been based
upon its reading of Federation v. Hanover School Corp.8 In the Han-
over School case, the school board had refused to engage in "meaning-
ful" bargaining with a new teachers' union, mailed individual contracts
to teachers, and terminated several teachers. The union challenged
these "unfair labor practices" under the 1871 Civil Rights Act and the
first amendment. The Seventh Circuit had affirmed a district court de-
cision finding the discharges to be in violation of the right to free asso-
ciation, as being in retribution for protected union activities, but deny-
ing relief for the alleged commission of an unfair labor practice in the
promulgation of individual contracts and the refusal to bargain with the
union in good faith. This latter point was found not to raise a federal
question. The court of appeals indicated that, while not all activities
of a union or its members are constitutionally protected, broad state
condemnation of union activities or discharge of employees for partici-
pation therein, which may include advocacy and persuasion on behalf
of the union cause, will run afoul of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and association.4 The court refused, however, to
read the good faith bargaining requirements of the Labor Management
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
3. 457 P.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1972) [79 LRRM 2299].
4. Id. at 460-61 [79 LRRM at 2301].
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Relations Act,5 which was inapplicable in this context, into the Civil
Rights Act.
The court of appeals in Aurora found the reliance below upon the
Hanover School decision to be misplaced. Here, said the court, the
school board rule might be read to encompass "mere philosophical or
political" advocacy of the right to strike. As here applied, the rule
"precludes a teacher from receiving a full salary and perquisites if, as
a mere matter of dogma, he holds to the belief that teachers should
be free to strike." Because of this overbreadth and "throttling of free-
dom," the board rule was held to be violative of the due process clause
as it incorporates the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech
and belief.
The Aurora School case does little more than restate the principles
of Yates v. United States,8 that mere advocacy is constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of expression. Aurora can no more be read as grant-
ing teachers the right to strike than numerous Supreme Court de-
cisions can be read as granting advocates of revolution the right to over-
throw government by violent means. The key point in Aurora is that
the plaintiff teachers suffered a loss of wages because they refused to
agree to a contract containing a clause which would condemn mere ad-
vocacy or belief.
Local 134, IBEW v. NLRB (ITT Corp.)9 raised a rather straight-
forward due process issue under the LMRA which was not, however,
couched in constitutional terms. The Labor Board had found that
Local 134 had committed an unfair labor practice within the purview
of section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act, which prohibits certain coercive
union pressures on employers in work assignment jurisdictional dis-
putes.
The court agreed that the Board's finding was not without suf-
ficient support in the record.10 However, enforcement was denied, be-
cause the hearing officer in the prior section 10(k) settlement proceed-
ing subsequently served prosecutorily as counsel for the General Coun-
sel in the section 8 unfair labor practice hearing. This commingling
of functions in one person was held to violate the Administrative Pro-
5. 29 U.S.C. § 151 etseq. (1970).
6. 490 F.2d at 434 [85 LRRM at 2032].
7. Id.
8. 345 U.S. 298 (1957).
9. 486 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1973) [84 LRRM 2401].
10. Id. at 866 [84 LRRM at 2403].
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cedure Act.1 The Board had stressed the fact that the two functions
were not pursued simultaneously. The court found the Board order
to be "tainted" because the hearing officer in fact was placed in the
circumstance of advocating a position based upon his own prior eviden-
tiary rulings. 2 The court hinted at due process considerations when
it likened Board hearing officers to federal judges and spoke of the
Board's practice in the case as being "incompatible with the accepted
norms for the proper administration of justice."'"
The court declined to reach the constitutional claim presented in
Teachers, Local 399 v. Michigan City Area Schools." Local 399 had
filed suit for an injunction against the school board and another union
which had been recognized by the board as the teachers' exclusive bar-
gaining agent and had been granted exclusive privileges of posting no-
tices, using school facilities, equipment, and modes of communication.
Local 399 claimed a violation of the first and fourteenth amendments,
upon which grounds the district court granted relief. The court of ap-
peals saw the issues raised on appeal to be (1) whether principles of
labor law, rather than constitutional law, controlled, and (2) if not,
whether a sufficient state interest was involved. The court skirted
these interesting questions, however. After the suit had been filed,
Indiana had passed a statute covering collective bargaining relation-
ships in schools, and had established a board to implement the new
law. This Board appeared to have jurisdiction over the instant matter.
Therefore, the court vacated the order below and remanded under the
doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies."6
ARBITRATION
Several cases last term involved the Seventh Circuit in the arbitra-
tion process. Under principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,1 the Norris-
La Guardia Act' 7 does not bar the granting of injunctive relief to an
employer under LMRA section 30118 to halt a union strike in breach
of a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement where (1)
the grievance is subject to arbitration under the contract, (2) the em-
11. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 (1970).
12. 486 F.2d at 868 [84 LRRM at 2404].
13. Id.
14. 499 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1974) [86 LRRM 2075].
15. Id. at 118 [86 LRRM at 2076].
16. 398 U.S. 235 (1970) [74 LRRM 2257].
17. 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1970).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
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ployer is prepared to proceed thereunder, and (3) there is irreparable
injury by reason of the union's contract breach. A failure to grant such
relief was held to be inconsistent with established federal labor law
policy favoring the peaceful resolution of labor disputes by means of
the arbitral process, as set forth in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills,"9 and the Steelworkers Trilogy.'0 In Old Ben Coal Corp. v.
United Mine Workers (Old Ben 11)21 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
issuance of a permanent injunction under the Boys Markets doctrine
where the union had engaged in a series of numerous work stoppages,
each of relatively short duration over issues subject to arbitration. The
series of strikes at issue in the instant proceeding occurred after the
issuance of an earlier injunction, affirmed in Old Ben , 2 in a previous
suit involving similar periodic work stoppages. The order there was
narrowed to the particular disputes before the court.
The union complained that the district court in Old Ben II, how-
ever, had based its order on a finding that the union's general policy
was one of "resort to self help through strikes and work stoppages
which were in violation of existing labor agreements", 23 and that the
judge erroneously considered strikes other than the only two strikes
occurring "after the members of the union had a fair opportunity to
appraise and to absorb the impact of Old Ben J.,,24 The other post-
Old Ben I strikes allegedly occurred within a month of that decision.
The court rejected this "grace period" argument, and also refused to
be swayed by the unions "bare numbers" contention, finding "ques-
tionable motivation" in the pattern of work stoppages. 5
The anion's second major argument was that the scope of the in-
junction, which was couched in the broad language of the collective
agreements, was overbroad and vague. However, because the union
had apparently shown itself, in the admonitory language of Old Ben
I, to be "unwilling to accept the present adjudication with respect to
its rights," and reading the Boys Markets decision to allow an injunc-
tion to be broad enough to facilitate the arbitral process, the court dis-
19. 353 U.S. 448 (1957) [40 LRRM 21131.
20. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)
[46 LRRM 2414]; United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960) [46 LRRM 2416]; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) [46 LRRM 2423].
21. 500 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1974) [87 LRRM 2078].
22. 457 F.2d 162 (7thCir. 1972) [79 LRRM 2845].




agreed. The "vagueness" argument was rejected on two grounds.
First, the order followed the contractual clause; second, the union
"would have access to declaratory remedies to avoid potential viola-
tions," and the issue would be considered in any future contempt pro-
ceeding for alleged violation of the injunction."
The court of appeals refused to allow deferral to the arbitral proc-
ess in two other cases, however, O.C.A.W. v. American Maize Prod-
ucts Co.27 and NLRB v. Chase Mfg. Co.2" In Chase, the court en-
forced the Labor Board's order where the employer had been found
to have violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by unilaterally
reducing employees' wage rates below the contract level. The em-
ployer's only challenge on appeal was to the Board's make-whole-with-
interest back pay order. The company contended that back pay was
a matter for arbitration under the collective agreement. Finding, with
the Board, that the employer had been seeking "to rid itself of the es-
tablished bargaining relationship and its attendant obligations of which
the contract wage rates were but a part", 2 9 the court refused to re-
quire deferral. The company had lost that opportunity by its "'com-
plete rejection of the principles of collective bargaining.'
In American Maize, the court affirmed the granting of defendant-
employer's motion for summary judgment where the union had sued
to compel arbitration of a grievance related to a lockout and hiring of
replacements. The basis for the ruling was that the parties' no-lockout
agreement became inoperative when the contract expired under its
terms pursuant to the union's notices of desire to amend and terminate
the agreement, and that the dispute was therefore not arbitrable. The
union disputed both the finding of expiration based on the notices and
the district court's jurisdiction to determine arbitrability where the dis-
pute involved more than the lockout itself. The court of appeals re-
jected both contentions.
NLRB ELECTION CHALLENGES
The court last term decided three cases in which employers based
their appeals from Labor Board bargaining orders upon challenges to
representation elections which resulted in union certification. Only
26. Id. at 952-53 [87 LRRM at 2080].
27. 492 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1974) [86 LRRM 2438].
28. 492 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1974) [85 LRRM 2602].
29. Id. at 1301 [85 LRRM at 2603].
30. Id,
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one employer was successful. The case is interesting from a factual,
if not a legal, point of view. In NLRB v. Urban Telephone Corp.,3 1
the court found that the Board erred in failing to set aside the elec-
tion32 where one Rodriguez, a physically imposing employee (who sup-
ported and worked with the union and whose activities were held to
be attributable to the union) had told four or five employees that if
the union lost, and he found out who voted against the union, there
would be "smashed faces."
While the main issue was the question of attributability of the
threats to the union, the Board, noting that ballots are cast in secret,
also argued that the threats were merely "conditional" and insuffici-
ently coercive. The court rejected this overly technical approach,
finding a sufficient atmosphere of fear among the employees and
stressing the closeness of the vote."3
The other two cases in this area, NLRB v. Visual Educom, Inc. 4
and NLRB v. Family Heritage Home, Inc.,"5 involved the technical suf-
ficiency of the employers' showing on objections to elections, and the
right to a Board hearing thereon. The court affirmed established law
on the subject in enforcing Board orders. Briefly put, an employer
objecting to an election has generally been held to have the affirmative
burden of presenting evidence that the election was unfair.3 6 A hear-
ing on objections will be ordered only where the employer's exceptions
to the regional director's findings on objections raise substantial and
material unresolved issues of fact or law. In Visual Educom, the em-
ployer presented the regional director with names of seven witnesses,
in a challenge based upon alleged union misrepresentations, but failed
to submit affidavits in support of the claim. The employer disputed
the Board's failure to grant a hearing. The court, while disagreeing
with the regional director's appraisal of the testimony of five witnesses,
sustained his conclusions, and found no entitlement to a Board hearing,
noting that the employer had not asked for one before the regional
director. In Family Heritage, entitlement to a hearing was also not
found. The case raises other issues which will be discussed below.
31. 499 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1974) [86 LRRM 2704].
32. The union won by a vote of 17-15.
33. 499 F.2d at 244 [86 LRRM at 2708].
34. 486 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1973) [84 LRRM 2319].
35. 491 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1974) [85 LRRM 2545].
36. The Board's investigatory activity is apparently more limited, and the moving
party's burden is higher, than where an unfair labor practice charge has been filed.
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SUCCESSORSHIP
The issue of the collective bargaining obligations of successor-
employers, and the factors in determining who constitutes a successor,
has been the subject of a great many decisions of the Labor Board and
the courts. While a large number of questions have been authorita-
tively settled, successorship cases continue to arise in factual situations
which require re-examination of prior law and a reassessment of the
balance which must be struck among competing interests. One such
case arose in the Seventh Circuit last term, Zim's Foodliner, Inc. v.
NLRB.3 7  It presented the following factual background. Kroger
Company had operated 57 retail food stores in Wisconsin. Eleven of
the stores were in a multi-store unit for collective bargaining with the
Retail Clerks. Five of the stores were in a multi-store unit organized
by the Meat Cutters. The history of recognition and organization of
the stores involved did not appear in the record, although there was
an indication that the Clerks unit resulted from a merger of locals.
The contracts for the two multi-store units required union shops.
Kroger sold two stores, one to each of two separate buyers. Each store
closed for two days and was reopened by its new owner with either
all or a large majority of old employees in the relevant departments.
One store, named "Zim's", had been in both the Meat Cutters' and
and the Retail Clerks' multi-store units while part of the Kroger opera-
tion. The other store, now named "Paul's", had been part of the Re-
tail Clerks' multi-store unit only. The new owners at both stores were
aware of the existence of the collective agreements when they pur-
chased their stores. Zim's refused to recognize and bargain with
either union. Paul's refused to recognize and bargain with the Retail
Clerks. Paul's lowered its wage rates and work hours below the old
contract level the day it opened under new management. Zim's held
the old rates for three weeks, and then followed suit. The unions filed
section 8(a)(5) charges with the Labor Board, which found both
employers to be successors and in violation of the Act. Zim's, but
not Paul's, was saddled with a back pay order based upon the reduction
in wage rates from prior contract levels. (The court affirmed this dis-
tinction on the ground that Paul's had not adopted any rates which
could be said to be "unilaterally changed.")
The major issue on appeal was whether fragmentation of the old
multi-store unit precluded a finding of successorship status and a cor-
responding duty to bargain in good faith. In resolving that issue in
the negative, the court undertook an extensive analysis of prior law,
37. 495 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1974) [85 LRRM 3019].
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starting with NLRB v. Burns International Security Services.88
In Burns, the Supreme Court had held that the successor employer
violated the Act by refusing to bargain with the union which had been
certified less than 12 months earlier, ,but before the transfer of the
business, as a result of a representation election in the designated unit
(consisting of guards). The new employer had hired 27 of the old
employees into a unit which now consisted of 42 guards. The nature
of the employment operation continued essentially unchanged, the
scope of the bargaining unit remained virtually the same, the guards
performed work under the same circumstances, and both employers
operated on a national scale. The Supreme Court majority had re-
jected the theory that, simply because it was not mathematically de-
monstrable that the union represented a majority of the reconstituted
group of employees, a bargaining order was inappropriate.
In Zim's, however, as the court noted, no such certification his-
tory was available to establish a one-year irrebuttable presumption of
majority status. Also, the bargaining unit had here been sliced to a
mere fraction of its former scope. The size and economic status of
the employing entities had changed drastically. These differences had
not been at issue in Burns.
As to the absence of a certification history, the court had little
trouble finding authority for discarding the point. While noting that
an objective showing of the existence of a representation question is
required to obtain an election,8 9 the panel suggested that employers
in such cases should bargain with the union involved, and, while bar-
gaining, might petition for an election.4"
The major problem for the court was how to deal with the drastic
reduction in size of the bargaining unit. Under Brooks v. NLRB41 and
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,42 the two major policy considerations in-
volved are (1) the employees' right to self-determination in the selec-
tion of their bargaining representative and (2) stability in the collective
bargaining context. In this case, a seeming clash between policies was
presented. A decision on either side would involve the court in mak-
38. 406 U.S. 272 (1972) [80 LRRM 2225].
39. U.S. Gypsum Co., 157 NLRB 652, 61 LRRM 1384 and 161 NLRB 601, 63
LRRM 1308 (1966).
40. 495 F.2d at 1140 [85 LRRM at 3025].
41. 348 U.S. 96 (1954) [35 LRRM 2158], which approved the Board rule requiring
that a union's certification be honored for one year.
42. 395 U.S. 575 (1969) [71 LRRM 2481] setting forth the circumstances under
which a bargaining order may issue, without a valid elwetion having first been held,
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ing an important presumption. If the bargaining orders were enforced,
the court would be championing bargaining stability over the self-deter-
minative rights of the individual employees. If the court were to deny
enforcement, it would be sacrificing stability for the sake of self-deter-
mination, on the assumption that, where the recognition history is "lost",
a single-store union majority must be affirmatively demonstrated. To
complicate matters further, it has been established in representation
cases that, as opposed to a multi-store unit, a single-store unit is pre-
sumptively appropriate for collective bargaining purposes.4"
The court disposed of contrary authority without effectively at-
tempting to distinguish such cases. Three major factors, based on the
ALJ's finding of fact, underlie the court's refusal to allow the change
in unit size and definition to destroy the pre-existing bargaining re-
lationship. First, the changes incident to the sale of the stores "were
not such as to significantly affect employee attitudes"; second, pure
mathematics alone as to union support will not raise a sufficient doubt
of continued majority in successorship cases; and, third, and most im-
portant, a continuation of the old employee complement raises a high
presumption of successorship. 41
The court cited its own decision in NLRB v. Armato45 for the
proposition that successorship can be found where the new employer
hired less than a majority of the predecessor unit. In Armato, how-
ever, the unit remained unchanged in scope, the successor was a lessee
of the predecessor, and the union had been certified only 10 months
earlier. The court failed to note these distinctions in Zim's. Yet it
concluded that the change in unit definition from large to small "would
seem not to raise any additional considerations beyond those disposed
of in Armato."4
In concluding that the change in unit size did not in itself remove
from the employers the duty to bargain, the court left open two bases
upon which the result could change in future cases. First, it indicated
that a contrary result would be possible if the single facility had been
added to the prior multi-facility unit by accretion, as in Atlantic Tech-
nical Services Corp.4 7 Second, of course, the employer might try to
meet the burden of showing that the employees in question no longer
wished to be represented by the union. Although the court noted that
43. See, e.g., Haag Drug Co., 169 NLRB No. 111, 67 LRRM 1289 (1968).
44. 495 F.2d at 1141 [85 LRRM at 3026].
45. 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1952) [31 LRRM 20891.
46. 495 F.2d at 1141-42 [85 LRRM at 3026].
47. 202 NLRB No. 13, 82 LRRM 1467 (1973), enf'd 86 LRRM 2182 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
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the Retail Clerks' unit history indicated prior single-unit representation,
its treatment of the Meat Cutters' unit, despite the absence of such
evidence, seems to shift the burden of proving accretive or non-single-
unit history squarely onto the employer.
As Judge Pell's dissent points out,48 the court may have here
parted company with the Fifth Circuit's position taken in NLRB v.
Alamo White Truck Service,4" where a finding of successorship was
rejected by the court under roughly similar circumstances. In NLRB
v. Zayre Corp.,5" the Fifth Circuit explained that the Alamo case in-
volved (1) a change from a large organization to a small one with di-
rect owner participation, (2) a reduction in unit size, and (3) a partial
cutback in operations. The Pell dissent urges that the change in size
of the employing entity has more relevance than the majority was
willing to concede. However, the Alamo case cannot be said to be
on all-fours with Zim's.
Family Heritage, discussed above, also involved a "successorship"
issue, albeit one less troublesome than that faced by the court in Zim's.
In enforcing an order directing the employer and its successors to bar-
gain with a newly certified union, the court rejected the employer's
contention that an alleged sale of his nursing home mooted the Board's
order, or that remand was in order. At the time of election, the em-
ployer was one of seven corporations, each operating a nursing home,
and wholly owned by a parent corporation. During Board representa-
tion proceedings, the seven were merged into a wholly-owned subsid-
iary of the parent. After the bargaining order, the assets of the seven
nursing homes were sold to an independent corporation which was not
a party to these proceedings on the appeal. Noting that if compliance
were impossible the "employer" would not be held responsible, the
court entrusted to Board compliance proceedings the determination of
the issue of mootness. 5'
DIsCRIMINATION BASED ON UNION ACTIVITY
Three cases last term involved relatively ordinary reviews of
Board findings that employers had violated sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)
(1) of the L.M.R.A. by firing or transferring employees: NLRB v.
Braswell Motor Freight Lines,52 Packerland Packing Co. v. NLRB, 8
48. 495 F.2d at 1146 [85 LRRM at 3029].
49. 273 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1959) [45 LRRM 23301.
50. 424 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1970) [74 LRRM 2084].
51. 491 F.2d at 351 [85 LRRM at 2547].
52. 486 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1973) [84 LRRM 2433].
53. 494 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974) [85 LRRM 2865].
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and NLRB v. Ri-Del Tool Mfg. Co.54
In 8(a)(3) cases, in order to prove a case of discrimination, it
has generally been required that the presence of four interlocking ele-
ments be demonstrated: (1) engagement by the employee in activity
protected by section 7 of the Act; (2) employer knowledge of such
activity; (3) an employer act which penalizes the employee, such as
discharge or transfer; and (4) animosity towards the union on the part
of the employer. The most difficult element to prove is the last-em-
ployer motivation. Where direct evidence, such as employer state-
ments, is unavailable the General Counsel can be expected to rely on
two factors from which an inference of improper motivation can be
made: (1) that the timing of the discharge or other employer act fol-
lowed closely the occurrence of protected activity; and (2) that the
asserted reason for the discharge, such as insubordination or absentee-
ism, has not resulted in similar sanctions in the case of other employees,
or in the past history of the discharged employee, and is therefore a
pretext.
Thus, in Ri-Del, the court enforced a reinstatement and back pay
order where a finding of improper motivation for a discharge was
based on suspicious timing and inconsistent application of disciplinary
policy. The record showed that the employee's services had in the past
been highly valued by the employer, the reasons for discharge, failure
to visit a doctor as ordered and alleged absenteeism, had not served
as reasons for discipline in the past, and the discharge followed by two
days the employee's commencement of solicitation of union authoriza-
tion cards from his fellow workers.
In the Braswell case, direct evidence in the form of a history of
employer statements of intent was available and the court had no dif-
ficulty in finding that layoffs, allegedly economically motivated, were
discriminatory. The bigger issue which divided the panel in the case
was whether or not two incidents covered by the complaint (but not
the charge) and "related" to the incident specified by the charge were
properly before the Board. The court found a "sufficient nexus" in
that the same international was involved in the three incidents, which
were seen as part of a company "overall plan to resist organization." 55
Judge Stevens dissented, chiefly on the ground that the court's focus
should have been on the interest of the employees involved; they were
in different bargaining units, and only one unit's local had filed a
54. 486 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1973) [84 LRRM 2630].
55. Id. at 776 [84 LRRM at 2435].
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charge."
In Packerland Packing Co, the discriminatory act alleged and
proven to the Board and the court's satisfaction was a transfer of three
city truck drivers, who had joined a picket line during a strike by the
certified representative of production and maintenance employees,
"into" the struck unit, where they were given different, injury-aggravat-
ing jobs. Judge Pell dissented on the ground that it had not been
clearly resolved whether or not these drivers "belonged" in the unit
to begin with. He indicated that the record supported the conclusion
that they did, that the employer was complying with an understanding
with the union, and that the issue of transfer should be deferred to
arbitration. Furthermore, the Judge questioned the propriety of the
Board's refusal to credit the testimony of the employer, which had been
credited by the ALJ, in apparent contradiction of the policy of Uni-
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB 57 favoring credibility determinations by
the initial trier of fact.
COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES UNDER
THE L. M. R. A. AND R. L. A.
In NLRB v. Gruber's Super Market, Inc.,5" the Seventh Circuit
last term again faced the question of determining the propriety of a
Gissel59 bargaining order. Gissel stands for the proposition that an em-
ployer may be ordered to bargain with a union, even though the union
has lost a Board-run election, if the union has a valid authorization card
majority among the employees in an appropriate unit, and the employer
has either committed "outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor prac-
tices, or sometimes less pervasive violations, tending to undermine the
union's majority and preclude the holding of a valid election within the
foreseeable future. In Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB,6 ° the court
had refused to enforce a Gissel-type order, because the Board failed
to make "'specific findings' as to the immediate and residual impact
of the unfair labor practices", and "a detailed analysis" assessing the
possibilities for holding a fair election in the future and "the potential
effectiveness of ordinary remedies". 61 The court chastised the Board
for its boilerplate approach to the issues.
56. Id. at 777 [84 LRRM at 2436].
57. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
58. 501 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1974) [87 LRRM 2037].
59. 395 U.S. 575 (1969) [71 LRRM 2158].
60. 484 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1973) [83 LRRM 3000].
61. Id. at 1118 [83 LRRM at 3007].
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In Gruber's, Judge Pell, writing for the majority, phrased the issue
as "whether a Gissel order should be enforced when there has been
a single act of unfair labor practice of arguable demonstrability and
an absence of either any other indication of anti-union bias or inter-
ference with protected employee rights under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act."6  At the store in question, the union, which had been re-
cently certified at the employer's other store, had obtained authoriza-
tion cards from nine of thirteen eligible employees. The employer
opted for a Board representation election. Three days before the vote,
the store manager called a meeting of employees, where he apparently
"promised" them wages comparable to those to be negotiated at the
other store, if the union lost (which it did by reason of a 5-5 tie). Over
six months after the alleged "promise", wage increases in line with the
other store were put into effect. Both objections to the election (based
on the "promise") and, later, unfair labor practice charges (based on
the wage increase) were filed by the union. The hearing on objections
resulted in the ordering of a new election. But the Board also found
the wage increase to be violative of section 8(a)(1) and the refusal
to recognize the union on the card majority violative of 8(a)(5), and
issued a bargaining order.
The court refused to call the employer's pre-election statement
(considered as background to the ULP charge) a "promise", finding
it could just as well be interpreted as a statement of the company's
established economic policy, if one were shown, of maintaining uniform
rates at its two stores, with or without a union, and could therefore
have even induced pro-union sentiment among the employees.
On the issue of the grant of wage increases, the question was
whether this was intended to affect the second election (as the AM
and Board found) or was instead motivated by lawful economic mo-
tives, as the employer maintained. The increase had occurred just be-
fore the hearing officer's decision on the objections to the election.
The court agreed that the wage increase violated section 8(a)(1), and
was unjustified by economic necessity. It found the decision to be a
"close one"."
The court then turned to its analysis under Gissel. Since the acts
in question could not be dubbed "outrageous", the issue was whether
or not these were nonetheless sufficient, under the second Gissel cate-
gory, to preclude a fair election. The Board's analysis, as in Peerless,
62. 501 F.2d at 698 [87 LRRM at 2037].
63. Id. at 703 [87 LRRM at 2041].
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had been little more than boilerplate. 4 The court refused to treat the
employer's lack of enthusiasm for the union as the equivalent of union
animus. The employer's economic justification for the wage raises
was reasonable, if not entirely sufficient. Second, no concrete evi-
dence of loss of employee interest in the union's campaign appeared
after the pre-election speech. Third, the Board's 8 (a) (1) order could
very well "decrease the likelihood of the recurrence of misconduct." 65
Lastly, a turnover of nearly half of the workforce had occurred. The
court reiterated that authorization cards are not the equivalent of a se-
cret election, which is the preferred method of determining representa-
tion questions under Gissel and Peerless.
For these reasons, the court, as it had in Peerless, felt it could
never enforce a bargaining order on these facts. It therefore declined
to take the traditional step of remand to the Board for further findings.
It directed the Board to hold an election. Judge Sprecher dissented
in a short opinion on the grounds that (1) the pre-election "promise"
in fact eroded union support and (2) the Board's analysis was suf-
ficient."
The Seventh Circuit dealt with the scope of Board remedies in
a number of other perhaps less significant cases. In NLRB v. Good
Foods Mfg. & Processing Corp.,6" after refusing to entertain the em-
ployer's appeal from section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) orders by reason
of a failure to file or press exceptions below, the court also declined
the union's request for it to expand upon the Board's remedial orders,
finding that they were sufficient under the circumstances and that no
long history of anti-union conduct was present.
In Regency Electronics, Inc. v. NLRB,68 where an election had
been set aside because the employer's campaign included distribution
of facsimiles of the official Board ballot bearing a red heart and an X
on the "NO" box, the Board was held warranted in setting a new voter
eligibility list, including those hired after the first election, for the sec-
ond election. The court enforced a bargaining order against the em-
ployer based on the results of this second election.
NLRB v. Nickey Chevrolet Sales 9 presented an unusual situation.
In 1965, the court of appeals enforced a Board 8(a)(3) order against
64. Id. at 704 n.7 [87 LRRM at 2042 n.7].
65. Id. at 705 [87 LRRM at 2043].
66. Id. [87 LRRM at 2043-44].
67. 492 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1974) [85 LRRM 2739].
68. 499 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1973) [84 LRRM 2891].
69. 493 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1974) [85 LRRM 2826].
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the employer. In 1971, the employer was held to be in contempt be-
cause of the firing of a certain employee, and was ordered to purge
itself through reinstatement and reimbursement of back pay and lost
benefits at 6% interest. The employee was reinstated, the Board
determined the back pay and issued an order to pay thereon. The
court held that the Board was without such authority because the dis-
charge had never been the subject of an unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding before the Board. Yet, acting on a suggestion made by the
employer at oral argument, the court treated the Board's findings as
those of a special master and adopted them,70 over Judge Pell's dissent
on the issue of attempts to find interim employment.
In Associated General Contractors v. Teamsters,71 the court held
that a union's damages recoverable by reason of the improvident issu-
ance of an injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act are limited to
the amount of the bond posted by the employer under section 7 of that
Act, where no formal motion to increase the size of the bond, or chal-
lenge thereto on the first appeal, was made. As the court acknowl-
edged, this conclusion, based on its reading of the statute, is in conflict
with the holding of the Third Circuit in U.S. Steel Corp. v. United Mine
Workers. 2 The court also held that the district court was not pro-
hibited from entering a declaratory judgment interpreting the collective
bargaining agreement by reason of the existence of a clause preserving
the union's right to use economic force in the event of disagreement.
Lastly, in United Transportation Union v. Baker,73 the court held
that the federal court was without jurisdiction where the union sought
an injunction restraining the Penn Central railroad from replacing a
work-posting crew board with computer printouts, in alleged violation
of the contract. The key issue was whether the dispute was "major"
or "minor" under the Railway Labor Act."4 If the railroad's action in-
deed were a unilateral departure from the collective agreement, then
it could not lawfully be implemented without prior mediation under
section 6 of the Act, and the court could enjoin the change to maintain
the status quo. If the question were merely one of interpretation of
the contract, then section 3 would apply, and the court would defer
to arbitration. The court, with Judge Campbell dissenting, found
70. Id. at 107, 108 [85 LRRM at 2828-29, 2830].
71. 486 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1973) [84 LRRM 2555].
72. 456 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1972) [79 LRRM 2518], cert. denied 408 U.S. 923
(1972).
73. 499 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1974) [85 LRRM 2526].
74. 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
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that the railroad's contractual defense was not frivolous, therefore held
the dispute to be "minor" and within section 3, and reversed the de-
cree. The conclusion is contrary to that reached by the Sixth Circuit
in U.T.U. v. Penn Central Co. 71 on the same facts. The Seventh Cir-
cuit criticized that court for going too far. The Sixth Circuit there ac-
tually interpreted the contract, and found the railroad to have departed
from it. In all fairness, the question is by no means an easy one. The
"major"/"minor" distinction is generally a deceptive labelling scheme,
as the conflict between the circuits demonstrates. Furthermore, one
must wonder whether the Seventh Circuit's approach, whereby it ac-
tually examined the evidence and found the railroad's contract inter-
pretation to be a possibly reasonable one, is consonant with considera-
tions of harmony in the collective bargaining sector. For the court left
the problem presented by the union to section 3 resolution without pro-
tecting the status quo and, indeed, without even deciding whether the
status quo had been altered.
EMPLOYERS' ECONOMIC WEAPONS
In NLRB v. Painting Contractors7 6 the Seventh Circuit refused
to enforce a Board order, where the Board had found an employer as-
sociation's lockout to be violative of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of
the Act. On February 14, 1972, the union notified the employers that
it wished to renegotiate the existing contract, which expired April 30.
On April 11, federal and state mediation agencies received a union re-
quest for services, and a federal mediator attended subsequent sessions,
which were not fruitful. From May 1 to May 9, the employers staged
a lockout. Under the proviso to section 8 (d) of the LMRA, a party
desiring to modify or terminate the contract must notify the other party
60 days prior to the expiration date, and must notify the federal and
state mediation agencies within 30 days of giving that notice. Under
section 8(d)(4), no strike or lockout is permitted by the party giving
notices until the end of the "cooling off" period. The Board held the
lockout here to be unlawful because, although the 60-day cooling-off
period had expired, and the mediation notice was untimely, the lockout
occurred within 30 days of the notice to the mediators.
In Local 219, Retail Clerks v. NLRB,17 it had been held by the
District of Columbia Circuit that an untimely notice to mediators would
still bar the party giving notice from striking or locking-out within 30
75. 443 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1971) [77 LRRM 2537].
76. 500 F.2d 54 (7th Cir.1974) [86 LRRM 2914].
77. 265 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1959) [43 LRRM 2726].
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days thereof. The Board, here, had applied that rule to the Painting
contractors, arguing that it applied to non-initiating parties as well, that
is, the party not giving the notice.
The Seventh Circuit's holding was two-fold: First, the require-
ments of section 8(d)(4) were read to apply only to the initiating
party. Second, the mutual good-faith bargaining requirement of sec-
tion 8(d) (by which non-initiating parties are subject indirectly to 8(d)
(4)-like prohibitions) were seen not to mandate the view that the 60-
day period consists of two-30 day segments, divided by notice to media-
tors. The court saw such a position to be untenable. No extension
of the cooling-off period is permitted by notice to mediators. The
court characterized the Board's position as in derogation of the Su-
preme Court's recognition of employers' right to lockout after a nego-
tiating impasse in American Shipbulding Co. v. NLRB.78 Under the
Seventh Circuit's current view parties who have not "initiated" the dis-
pute and who have waited out the 60-day cooling-off period may not
be placed at the mercy of the initiator who, by an untimely notice to
mediators, seeks to tie the heretofore passive party's hands. Local 219
has therefore been rejected to the extent that it is inconsistent with Paint-
ing Contractors. The Seventh Circuit attempted to leave itself equi-
table room to maneuver in the event of a case on facts like those pre-
sented in Local 219, where a union, the initiating party, struck after
the 60-day cooling off period and 10 days after itself giving untimely
notice to mediators. Painting Contractors indicates that an initiator
could be penalized for such untimely notice by curtailing its right to
use economic weapons in such circumstances. 79
CONCLUSION
While it may not be the front-runner in the evolution of labor law,
the Seventh Circuit last term demonstrated that it will continue to fol-
low an independent, if not always consistent, path in confronting the
issues presented to it. The court on several occasions openly ques-
tioned or rejected the determinations of its brethren in other circuits.
It has also shown that it will, on occasion, take an activist role in cases
involving and arising from the Labor Board. While the court was not
provided the opportunity to decide a true landmark case last term, it
appears to be willing and able to bring the keen, fresh, and pragmatic
approach that will be required if and when the occasion arises.
78. 380 U.S. 300 (1965) [58 LRRM 2672].
79. 500 F.2d at 57 [86 LRRM at 2918].
